Real effects of regional house prices: dynamic panel estimation with heterogeneity by Muñoz, Sònia
Real Eﬀects of Regional House Prices: Dynamic
Panel Estimation with Heterogeneity
Sònia Muñoz∗
London School of Economics and IMF†
This Version: October, 2003
Abstract
This paper uses recently developed methods for estimating dynamic het-
erogeneous cointegrated panel data models - which allows for heterogeneity
in parameters and dynamics across agents - to study housing wealth eﬀects
in a dynamic model of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia from
the 1970s to the 1990s. The results show that housing prices have a unit
root and are cointegrated with consumption. Even though an aging popu-
lation has some eﬀect on consumption in some states, it cannot account for
the heterogeneity in housing wealth elasticities. Finally, we find that when
state heterogeneity is taken into account, housing capital gains translate
into increased spending with an elasticity ranging from 0.15 to 0.23.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years, the United States (US) has experienced a housing boom,
with prices continuing to rise at higher rates than in the 1980s. Figure 1.1 shows
how real housing prices have risen steadily since 1994.
Figure 1.1: Real Housing Prices
Over the last couple of years, house prices in most parts of the US have, rather
surprisingly, stayed high despite the downturn in the economy. This has coincided
with the decline in the stock market. The apparently firmness of housing prices
has been explained by the drop in mortgage interest rates and by the combination
of a strong housing demand and the stability of housing supply1.
The importance of housing wealth and the mortgage debt available against this
wealth has increased over the last 20 years in the United States (US). In 1982 the
ratio of debt to equity was 0.43 while in 2002 it reached 0.80 (See Table 1.1). Of the
increase in housing stock, the greater part has been due to changes in the relative
value of houses. Figure 1.2 shows that inflation-adjusted home prices explain
most of the changes in real home equity. Increases in home prices have outpaced
overall inflation for the last decade, so widespread home price inflation has lifted
1See Krainer (2002) for a discussion.
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1972 1976 1982 1986 1992 1996 2002
Home equity 3234 3380 4497 5654 5461 5435 7587
Mortgage Debt 1498 1649 1933 2703 3666 4102 6054
Mortgage Debt/Home equity .46 .49 .43 .48 .67 .75 .80
Note: All figures are in 2002 billions of dollars
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds of Accounts (Table B.100)
Table 1.1: Home Equity and Mortgage Debt
household net worth. Despite huge gains in stocks during the 1990s, housing assets
still account for most of the wealth of most Americans. Home equity remains the
cornerstone of household wealth, even among the majority of homeowners who
also have stock holdings. In 1998 around 50 percent of homeowners held at least
50 percent of their wealth in home equity. Less than one half of all households
hold stocks and the top one percent own one-third of the total value. In addition,
property prices are much less volatile than share prices, so that there should be
far less uncertainty surrounding gains and losses in property wealth.
This motivates the interesting question whether house prices have influenced
the real economy significantly.
Over the 25 years from 1970 to 1995 house price inflation at the national
level moved relatively roughly in line with the CPI inflation. (Figure 1.3 plots
house price inflation and consumer price index (CPI) inflation since 1976). Given
this close comovement it was hard to identify the eﬀect of housing wealth on
consumption. In the last few years the movement of house price and CPI inflation
has been diﬀerent. Figure 1.3 shows how since 1995, the series have grown apart.
This suggests that the relative eﬀect of housing and CPI prices and home equity
on consumption may be identified with national aggregates. However, the close
correlation between national housing prices and CPI has obscured the degree of
heterogeneity and diversity between states. Looking at the state level allows us
to examine the high degree of diversity and helps to identify the eﬀects of house
prices on consumption.
Traditionally, empirical work on housing prices has focused on national level
aggregate data, although micro-econometric studies has increased recently. We
use state level data to be able to exploit cross-sectional variation and at the same
time reduce the measurement error included in micro-data. The same idea has
been explored by Case et al. (2001) but this paper improves the methodology
used and comes to some diﬀerent conclusions. In particular, this paper takes
into account the long-term relationship between consumption, labour income and
housing prices in order to estimate the eﬀects of housing on consumption. As
a consequence, the estimated eﬀect of housing prices on consumption more than
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Figure 1.2: Real Home Equity and Real House Prices
doubles that of Case et al. (2001). In addition, the paper explores possible sources
of heterogeneity among state estimates.
A national housing bubble has been denied by some economists, yet local
inflations have appeared in New York and parts of California (The Economist
March 6, 2003). Figure A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 show the log level of housing prices
in four regions: the Northeast, Midwest, South and West. There is an obvious
change in behaviour from the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Before,
they were very volatile, whilst they have been relatively smooth since. Similar
patterns of boom and bust were followed by new construction before the 1990s.
National data masks heterogeneity across states and regions: the plots show that
only in the Northeast is there coherence amongst states. In the other regions,
particularly the West, there is more diversity within region than between regions.
Average annual house prices have appreciated in the West and in the Northeast
during the 1976-96 period, while real prices declined in the South and Midwest.
The timing of the real price changes also diﬀers between regions. In the 1970s,
real prices more than doubled in the West, while homes in the Northeast gained
only 17 percent. During the late 1980s, real prices declined in all regions except
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Figure 1.3: CPI Inflation and House Price Inflation
the Northeast. Despite reductions at the end of the decade, real prices in the
Northeast climbed 39 percent between 1980 and 1990. Homes in the West declined
in value by nearly 10 percent, and those in the South and Midwest lost more than
20 percent of their real value.
The contribution of the paper is twofold: it describes the time series proper-
ties of state housing prices in the US and it shows how house prices are related
to consumption taking into account state heterogeneity, demography and home-
ownership rates.
Since there is a great diversity of state housing market activity in the US,
it will be necessary to study state disaggregated consumer spending and house
prices in order to allow inter-state and regional diﬀerences and, then, achieve a
tighter estimation. The model will seek to overcome the drawbacks of national
level aggregate data in imposing equal slope parameters across states. In addition,
since individuals in states can borrow from each other, each state in the panel is
considered as an open economy where shocks can be transmitted through the
housing and credit markets. To this end, we will use state cross-sectional and
quarterly time-series data for the period 1975:1 to 1996:4. The choice of state
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data for this exercise is explained by the fact that wealth eﬀects coming from
housing prices are locally driven - while wealth eﬀects coming from the stock
market and capital inflows are nationally driven. The study will estimate dynamic
heterogeneous panel models and will allow for spillover eﬀects between states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 assesses the links between housing
wealth and consumption and reviews the empirical literature. Section 3 describes
the behaviour of state housing prices in the United States. Section 4 shows eﬃcient
ways of modelling state variables such as consumption and house prices. Section 5
compares and contrast my results with Case et al. (2001) and section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Assessment of the Links between Housing
Wealth and Consumption: An Empirical Literature Re-
view
The fact that consumer spending has amounted to about 90 percent of income has
led some earlier analysts to suppose that income alone could explain consumption.
Yet diﬀerent studies have shown that wealth can explain up to one fifth of total
consumption. Income and wealth do not move tightly together over time, and
their relationship is generally not stable. As a consequence, the behaviour of
wealth represents an additional instrument in understanding consumption.
Housing prices can have an eﬀect on consumption through both the easing
of liquidity constraints and wealth eﬀects. The easing of liquidity constraints is
very intuitive. If households are liquidity constrained, access to credit against the
value of the house would alleviate the constraint. Rising house prices increase
house equity. Households can choose to sell the house or to refinance their mort-
gages (taking a loan on the increase of the house value) and taking cash in the
process. House appreciation is therefore a determinant of consumption. House-
holds can trade up for better houses, purchase goods and services and accumulate
resources for retirement. In addition, even for homeowners who do not refinance,
the increase in home equity leads to a rise in consumer confidence.
Wealth eﬀects are, however, more diﬃcult to quantify, since diﬀerent forces
go in opposite directions. Some households choose to move to smaller houses
when they get older. These downsizers are better oﬀ when house prices increase
relative to other prices and can therefore increase their consumption. At the same
time, house price appreciation undermines aﬀordability, especially for first-buyers
who are struggling to save for the downpayment and qualify for a mortgage. In
addition, some households who own small houses want to move to larger houses,
and these upsizers might respond to the increase of housing prices by reducing
their consumption. Determining the relative magnitude of these eﬀects is diﬃcult.
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The Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, Edward M. Gramlich2 suggested that
downsizers generally have higher marginal propensities to consume out of housing
wealth than upsizers since downsizers tend to be older and have more time to
smooth consumption, whilst upsizers tend to be liquidity constrained. According
to that hypothesis, housing prices might have a positive eﬀect on consumption. In
the end, the relative response of downsizers and upsizers is an empirical question.
In section 4 we will estimate the wealth eﬀect of changes in housing prices.
Before that, we summarize the previous literature dealing with housing eﬀects on
consumption that use diﬀerent data than our own.
Some studies have tried to answer the question of whether housing wealth has
an eﬀect in the real economy. McFadden (1994a, 1994b) finds that the impact
of house price changes on consumer welfare are quite small (and predicts that
house prices will be stable for the generations to come). Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) argue that temporary movements in asset values are often not associated
with aggregate consumption movements, and only permanent changes in wealth
aﬀect consumption. However, Skinner (1996) suggests that one of the reasons why
housing wealth is important for consumption is that there are regional fluctuations
in housing prices even when national housing prices are flat.
Bosworth, Burtless and Sabelhaus (1991) argue that capital gains may have
contributed to lower savings rates since savings rates of homeowners fell much
more than those of nonhomeowners since the 1960s. They claim that the boom
in housing prices may have contributed to reduced household savings. They also
find that the decline for homeowners is pronounced in the middle age group. Sum-
mers and Carroll (1987) also argued that the growth in mortgage debt during the
previous eight years has increased consumer spending and depressed private sav-
ings. Manchester and Poterba (1989) find that the incidence of second-mortgage
borrowing rose from 1.5 percent of all mortgages in 1970 to 10.8 percent in 1987
and was concentrated in the middle age group. Their view is that increased ac-
cess to second mortgages has reduced personal savings. Some second mortgages
are incurred when a home is purchased, but post-acquisition second mortgages
have grown faster. An alternative possibility is that households could have used
second mortgages to invest in other assets or to repay other debts, although the
majority of households used the second mortgages to make home improvements.
They find that while net housing equity does not have a significant impact on
second mortgage probabilities, accrued capital gains have a significant eﬀect on
second mortgage probabilities.
Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2002) apply the financial accelerator mecha-
2Remarks by Governor Edward M. Gramlich: “Consumption and the Wealth Eﬀect: The
United States and the United Kingdom”. Before the International Bond Congress, London, UK.
February 20, 2002.
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nism3 proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) to the household sector
and show that fluctuations in house prices significantly aﬀect the value of houses
as collateral and influence borrowing conditions for households in the UK. The
model is based on the macroeconomic eﬀects of imperfections in credit markets
that generate premia on the external cost of raising funds. They find that endoge-
nous developments in credit markets such as variations in collateral or net worth
amplify shocks to the economy. Consequently, a positive shock to the economy
causes a rise in housing demand that leads to a rise in house prices and an increase
in homeowners’ net worth. This decreases the external finance premium that leads
to a further rise in consumption demand. Muelbauer and Murphy (1993, 1995,
1997) also argue that changes in housing values can change the borrowing oppor-
tunities of constrained households via a collateral eﬀect.
2.1. The Standard Model
The theory of consumer behaviour has been described by Friedman (1957), Ando
and Modigliani (1963) and Galí (1990) among others. The latter develops a
model for time-series analysis of aggregate consumption which dispenses with the
assumption of an infinite-lived representative consumer4. Therefore the model
preserves the main features of the explicitly aggregated life-cycle models (Ando
and Modigliani, 1963) but gains the tractability of the infinite-horizon model in
terms of its econometric implementation. The life-cycle models account for two
factors: (a) finite horizons and (b) a life-cycle profile for individual labor income
characterized by retirement in a late stage of the cycle. Therefore they assume
the existence of annuity markets whenever there is uncertainty about death.
Galí (1990) proposes a discrete-time, quadratic-utility, open economy version
of the overlapping-generations framework in Blanchard (1985) where each con-
sumer born at time s maximizes his expected present discounted value of utility
as follows:
maxEt
∞[
j=0
(1 + δ)−j (1− p)j U (cs,t+j) , (2.1)
subject to
Ws,t+1+j = Ws,t+j (1 + z) + yls,t+j − cs,t+j , (2.2)
3The mechanism goes as follows: when house prices fall, households that are moving home
have a smaller net worth available for the purchase of the new house. Therefore they will get
less favourable mortgage interest rates when renegotiating their mortgage, and have less scope
for extracting additional equity to finance consumption.
4The infinite-horizon model appears as a special case of the model by a specific configuration
of values for those parameters.
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lim
j→∞
(1 + z)−jWs,t+j = 0, (2.3)
for j=0,1,2,..., and where c is consumption, W is nonhuman wealth, and yl
is labour income, xs,t is the value of variable x at time t, for a consumer born
in period s. δ is the discount rate. Etxs,t+j denotes the expected value of xs,t+j
conditional on the consumer being alive in period t+j, given the information avail-
able at time t. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 are the budget constraint and transversality
condition, respectively. Individuals are born with zero financial wealth.
Galí (1990) derives from this model the aggregate consumption that is given
by
ct = Ω+ βylt + zWt + ut, (2.4)
where
β ≡ z
(z + α)
, Ω ≡ βµ (1− α)
(z + α)
,
ut ≡ β
∞[
j=1
(1 + z)−j (1− α)j (Et∆ylt+j − µ) .
and (1 + z) ≡ (1 + r) (1 + p)−1, with (1 + r) being the pure interest rate and
(1 + p)−1 the annuity rate; α is the rate by which services supplied by an individual
consumer is assumed to decline; and µ = E (∆yl)is assumed.
Equation 2.4 establishes a linear relationship between aggregate consumption,
labour income and nonhuman wealth in line with the life-cycle model of Ando and
Modigliani (1963) and its aggregation properties generate a simple relationship
between the coeﬃcients of the consumption equation and the underlying structural
parameters. The model is constructed based on the maintained hypothesis that
the aggregate labour income is a unit-root process with drift and implies that W
and c are also unit-root processes, and both ut and ∆W are stationary. Therefore,
the model implies a common trend in c, yl and W .
In this model, an unexpected increase in wealth will raise consumption over
the lifetime. Agents will consume more today and save less. Aggregate, planned
consumption is explained by labour income and wealth. However, actual con-
sumption is not always equal to planned consumption due to several factors such
as adjustment costs, habit formation in consumption and liquidity constraints.
Adjustment costs can prevent consumers adjusting their housing services within
each period. If habit persistence is in place, households adjust their consumption
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slowly towards the equilibrium level slowly. Capital restrictions prevent indi-
viduals smoothing consumption by borrowing, hence these liquidity constrained
consumers follow current consumption more closely. For these reasons we allow
adjustment lags in the consumption function. In this sense, consumption will
adjust to the planned level with an error correction dynamic specification.
2.2. The Consumption Function incorporating Housing Wealth
In what follows we will estimate aggregrated consumption functions at the state
level and investigate the role of housing prices as a proxy for housing wealth.
We will follow an Error Correction Model (ECM) for the estimation with each
equation:
∆yit = α1

θi +
k[
j=1
βjxjit−1 − yit−1

+
m[
s=1
γs∆yit−s +
m[
s=1
k[
j=1
γjs∆xjit−s (2.5)
with yi = θi+
Sk
j=1 βjxji being the long-run relationship and where xjit stands
for labour income and housing prices and yit for consumption.
By using an ECM we maintain the rationality implied by the Euler equation in
the long-run, but we relax it in the short-run, where agents and households may
be subject to various frictions. The ECM allows one to distinguish between the
long-run relationship among the variables of interest and the short-run variation
around the equilibrium. Even though the optimization is based on the long-run
relationship, modelling the short-run dynamics is necessary for a proper descrip-
tion of the process. The idea is that outside forces drive the common stochastic
trends in consumption, income and housing, whilst short-run shocks divert con-
sumption, income and housing prices from their planned time paths. Adding the
latter to the ECM improves the fit of the regression.
Unfortunately, there is no series of housing wealth by state available5. How-
ever, we will calculate a proxy in section 5 to facilitate comparison. Since the
major variation in housing wealth comes from changes in housing prices, we es-
timate the consumption functions using housing prices instead of housing wealth
in this section. Another series that is missing at a state level is consumption.
We proxy it by Retail Sales (See Appendix 2 for detail description of the data).
We calculate real per capita retail sales by deflating by our calculated state CPI
and using interpolated state population following Chow and Lin (1971). This is
because population estimates by state are only available on an annual basis.
5In addition, there are no series of stock wealth and high frequency demand deposits (non-
equity financial wealth) by state either. A calculation of a proxy for them will imply too strong
assumptions leading to misleading results.
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Our long-run equilibrium consumption equation extends from 1975:1 to 1996:4
and uses real per capita retail sales (real per capita consumption, hereafter), real
per capita labour income and real housing prices.
The decision whether to pool the data will depend both on the degree of
heterogeneity and on the purpose of the exercise. We want to estimate a dynamic
consumption model from a panel set of data in which we a have a number of
economic units (states in the US) i = 1, 2, ...,N (51 states) and a number of
times series observations, t = 1, 2, ..., T (T=88, from 1975q1 to 1996q4). Since
both T and N are relatively large, two issues arise. First, time series are usually
non-stationary and certain combinations of them are stationary (we deal with
this issue in the next two subsections). Second, because of the large T, we can
estimate a regression for each state, parameters can vary a lot among states, and
so we should think about heterogeneous panels (we deal with this issue below).
Ando and Modigliani’s model does not imply that there is a cointegrating
relationship among consumption, labour income and wealth. Rather, it says that
consumption is linearly related to labour income and wealth. As seen above, Galí
(1990) however, shows that consumption, income and wealth share a common
trend. Therefore, if variables under study are unit root, estimates would be not
consistent unless consumption is cointegrated with income and wealth variables.
3. Housing Prices in the United States
3.1. House Price Inflation versus CPI Inflation
One of the most interesting features of Figure 1.3 is that annual home price
inflation is currently well above consumer price inflation. In addition, diﬀerentials
in house price inflation tend to be persistent. One explanation for this is that
house price changes are persistent themselves. Asset prices are expected to adjust
automatically to the new information on the fundamental value, yet housing prices
appear to adjust gradually. Krainer (2002) points to two possible reasons. First,
housing markets might be ineﬃcient because either the market does not clear
automatically or housing price expectations are backward-looking. And second,
house prices themselves depend on persistent variables such as employment growth
and changes in personal income.
Cecchetti et al. (2000) find that price level divergences across the US cities are
temporary although persistent. They show that the relative price levels among
cities mean revert at an exceptionally slow rate due to a combination of trans-
portation costs, diﬀerential speeds of adjustment to small and large shocks, and
the inclusion of non-traded good prices in the overall price index.
Table 3.1 explores this idea for both real house price inflation and CPI inflation
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for the US state data and gives the highest and lowest 10 and 20-year rate of
housing price real appreciation and CPI6 inflation in each state. It shows big
fluctuations in real state housing prices and, most importantly, big diﬀerences
among states in the same period. These localized price declines/increases aﬀect
household networth and contribute to the stress on financial institutions. For
instance, while Massachusetts had the highest housing price inflation rate of 11.42,
North Dakota had the lowest (4.23) during the period 1975-1985. At the same
time, the highest CPI inflation rate was Ohio with 7.64 and the lowest New York
with 6.35. The diﬀerence between the maximum and minimum is larger for the
1975-85 period than for the 1986-96 and, as expected, decreases as the sample
increases. As Cecchetti et al. (2000) point out, inflation diﬀerences seem to
reverse themselves since the high inflation during the period 1986-96 is preceded
by a relatively low rate during the previous decade (as the New York case shows).
House price changes, however, behave in a diﬀerent way. While on average the
diﬀerence between the state with the highest and the lowest inflation rate is 0.35
percentage points for the whole period, the same average for changes in housing
prices is 4.09 percentage points. The speed of adjustment for CPI rates is slow, and
it takes over 20 years for state CPI rates to converge. The speed of convergence of
housing prices, however, is too slow suggesting that real house price diﬀerentials
Index Sample Maximum State Minimum State Diﬀerential
Real House Price 1975-1985 11.42 Massachusetts 4.23 North Dakota 7.19
Inflation 1986-1996 7.10 Oregon .51 Alaska 6.59
1975-1996 7.55 California 3.47 North Dakota 4.09
CPI 1975-1985 7.64 Ohio 6.35 New York 1.29
Inflation 1986-1996 3.90 New York 2.90 Texas 1.00
1975-1996 5.31 Washington 4.96 Michigan .35
Table 3.1: House Price Inflation and CPI Inflation Rates
it seems the series are non-stationary.
Univariate unit-root tests like those of Dickey and Fuller have proved to have
extremely low power and tend to be biased towards failing to reject the
null of unit root in small samples, hence we will use the Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2003) (IPS) test, which proceeds as follows:
1. First we will eliminate the common time eﬀect θt by substracting the cross-
sectional mean from the data (qi,t) as follows:
q˜i,t = qi,t − (1/N)
N[
i=1
qi,t (3.1)
θt stands for the common time eﬀect, that is, macroeconomic shocks that
induce cross-sectional dependence. The latter cannot be introduced in a univari-
ate regression, but it can be fully taken into account by substracting the cross-
sectional mean of the variable under study. In this way, it will take into account
the cross-sectional dependence asymptotically7.
2. We then calculate the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-GLS test8 by Elliot, Rothen-
berg, and Stock (1996) of each state by regressing ∆q˜i,t on q˜i,t−1, a constant, a
trend and lagged values of ∆q˜i,t.
∆q˜i,t = αi + βiq˜i,t−1 +
ki[
j=1
γij∆q˜i,t−j + "i,t (3.2)
where αi accounts for the heterogeneity among states - reasons for such het-
erogeneity being diﬀerent tax rates and income levels. Note that these regressions
implicitly allow for θt on the right-hand side since we have adjusted series qi,t by
substracting the estimated common macro eﬀect through (1/N)
SN
i=1 qi,t.
7Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2000) also control for residual dependence across individu-
als and calculate the p-values of the IPS test from a parametric bootstrap consisting of 2000
replications using the estimated error-covariance matrix in the data-generating process.
8DF-GLS test is a modified augmented Dickey-Fuller test where the times series is trans-
formed via a generalized least squares regression (GLS) prior to performing the test.
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The null hypothesis is that each series has a unit root, Ho : βi = β = 0 for
all i. The interpretation is as follows: the closer the estimate of β is to zero,
the closer to a stationary process ∆q˜i,t is, implying that q˜i,t is a unit root non-
stationary process. The alternative hypothesis is Ha : βi < 0 for some i, allowing
for heterogeneity across states.
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∆ lnhp Levels
State t¯ lags
Alabama -1.752 11
Alaska -2.261 8
Arizona -3.873 9
Arkansas -1.881 9
California -2.007 8
Colorado -2.654 8
Connecticut -2.539 9
Delaware -2.415 9
District of Columbia -1.742 5
Florida -3.703 10
Georgia -2.283 10
Hawaii -1.794 1
Idaho -1.965 8
Illinois -1.453 2
Indiana -0.929 7
Iowa -1.920 11
Kansas -1.503 5
Kentucky -0.875 3
Louisiana -2.550 5
Maine -1.560 6
Maryland -2.051 4
Massachusetts -2.157 10
Michigan -0.990 6
Minnesota -1.293 6
Mississippi -1.399 8
Missouri -3.185 9
Montana -2.388 10
Nebraska -2.373 11
Nevada -1.129 1
New Hampshire -2.415 8
New Jersey -1.733 11
New Mexico -2.683 10
New York -2.593 7
North Carolina -1.926 8
North Dakota -0.903 5
Ohio -2.487 11
Oklahoma -2.348 5
Oregon -2.435 7
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Levels
State t¯ lags
Pennsylvania -2.268 6
Rhode Island -2.670 10
South Carolina -1.438 11
South Dakota -2.063 10
Tennessee -1.874 5
Texas -1.515 3
Utah -2.868 9
Vermont -1.535 11
Virginia -1.596 8
Washington -2.677 6
West Virginia -1.408 9
Wisconsin -1.624 1
Wyoming -2.032 11
Average -2.034
Note: IPS test. 5% Critical
Value:-2.36 from Im, Pesaran,
and Shin (2003, table 2).
Sample Period: 1975:1-1996:4
Table 3.2: Panel Unit-Root Test for log Housing Prices
In order to determine the lag length (ki) of equation 3.2 we follow Ng and
Perron (1995). They suggest a sequential t-test algorithm for choosing k. For
instance, let us suppose that we start with ki = 6. If the absolute value of the
t-ratio for γi6 is less than 1.96, we reset ki = 5 and reestimate the equation. The
process stops when the estimated coeﬃcient with the longest lag exceeds 1.96.
3. We calculate the IPS test statistic t¯ by averaging the univariate ADF test
ti:
t¯ = (1/N)
N[
i=1
ti. (3.3)
4. The null hypothesis is that each series has a unit root and there exists
cross-sectional independence among them. Since the asymptotic distributions of
the t-bar statistics are nonstandard and do not have analytic expressions, we will
use the critical values tabulated by IPS using Monte Carlo simulations.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the IPS test for the whole period sample. The
results provide evidence towards the existence of a stochastic trend in the series
of interest. In most of the cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root.
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The IPS test t¯ is -2.03 and the critical value -2.36, hence we cannot reject the
null of a unit root in housing prices. The interpretation of failing to reject the
null hypothesis is interpreted as implying that housing prices are trended, in this
instance upwards. Relative house prices do not converge to a common trend.
Since housing prices could wander apart indefinitely, they may become arbitrarily
high or low. Hence the issue of possible cointegration arises.
4. Methodology
The aim of this section is modelling the consumption-house prices linkage in order
to shed light on how closely the two variables are actually correlated.
4.1. Integration
As a first step, we test the consumption series for integration as we did for housing
prices series. Table 4.1 shows the IPS test results for real per capita consumption
and real per capita labour income. These tests give unambiguous results, unit
roots appear to be present for the log levels of the series in all three cases.
Levels
Variable t¯
C -2.157
Y -2.068
HP1 -2.034
Note: IPS test. 5% Critical
Value: -2.36 from Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003, table 2).
Sample Period: 1975:1-1996:4
1Later on we will show that
housing wealth has a t¯ of -2.118
Table 4.1: Panel Unit-Root Tests
Since both the independent and dependent variables are non-stationary, we
now test whether a combination of them is stationary - a test of whether C, Y
and HP are cointegrated.
4.2. Cointegration in Heterogeneous Panels
We follow Pedroni (1999) in testing the null of no cointegration in heterogeneous
panels. The advantage of this test is that it allows for heterogeneity among
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individuals, both in the long-run cointegrating vector and the short-run dynamics
from the cointegrating vectors. In addition it allows for multiple regressors.
We first compute the OLS residuals ei,t from each cointegration regression:
yi,t = αi + δit+
k[
j=1
βjix1i,t + ei,t (4.1)
estimated from state i.
t = 1, ..., T, T being the number of observations over time; i = 1, ....,N , N
being the number of states; j = 1, ..., K, K being the number of regressors.
We the we calculate the Panel Cointegration Statistic (Group t-Statistic) as
the sum of the individual ADF t-statistic (τ i) :
Z˜∗tN,T = N τ¯ =
N[
i=1
τ i (4.2)
with a distribution expressed as
1√
N
Z˜∗tN,T − µ
√
N
√
ν
=
√
N τ¯ − µ
√
N√
ν
D−→ N(0, 1)
where µ and ν are functions of the moments of the underlying Brownian motion
functionals that can be found in Table 3 (Pedroni, 1999).
Table 4.2 shows the results of the test. These are one-sided statistics with
a critical value of -1.64, thus large negative values imply rejection of the null of
no cointegration. The table shows that in all cases, with or without intercept
and trend included, we can reject the null of no cointegration. Cointegration
estimates are robust to the presence of measurement error and endogeneity of the
regressors, hence the superconsistency result. So there is evidence that C, W and
Y are cointegrated and that they form a meaningful regression relationship.
Pedroni Group t-statistic With housing prices With housing wealth
t p-value t p-value
Standard case -12.452 0.000 -12.988 0.000
Heterogeneous Intercept Included -8.444 0.000 -8.902 0.000
Heterogeneous Trends and Intercepts Included -4.758 0.000 -4.935 0.000
Note: t-value calculated following Pedroni (1999)
One-tailed test at 5 percent level on the Normal distribution. Critical value: -1.64
Table 4.2: Cointegration IPS Test
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4.3. Estimation and Results
In this section we deal with the estimation of a consumption function in which
the regressors are non-stationary and there exists cointegration among variables.
We consider three estimators: the Mean Group (MG) Estimator, the Pooled
Mean Group (PMG) Estimator and the Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(DSUR) Estimator.
4.3.1. Mean Group Estimator
One way to estimate panel data models is to estimate the separate equations for
each group of individuals and study the distribution of the mean of the estimated
coeﬃcients across groups. Since T is large (88 observations) we can estimate
an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL(p, q, q, ..., q)) model for each group
separately as follows:
yit =
p[
j=1
λijyi,t−j +
q[
j=0
δijxi,t−j + µi + εit (4.3)
where xit is the vector of regressors for each equation i and µi the constant for
each equation. (We include in one of the models seasonal dummies). We allow for
diﬀerent lag order for each state and use the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC)
to select the right lag order.
In what follows we work with the more convenient re-parameterization of the
ARDL model of the form of an ECM as equation 2.5 above. Pesaran and Smith
(1995) show that this MG estimator gives consistent estimates of the average of
the parameters. The drawback is that it does not take into account the fact that
some parameters might be the same across groups.
Table A.2 and A.3 present the MG estimated results (the first table does not
include seasonal dummies whilst the second one does). The first column of the
tables shows the lag orders for each group selected by the SBC, and the second,
third and fourth illustrate the labour income elasticity, housing price elasticity
and the adjustment coeﬃcient of equation 2.5 respectively. Table A.2 illustrates
how labour income and housing elasticities seem to diﬀer among states. Housing
prices are significant in half of the states, probably due in part to the fact that
synergies among states are not taken into account (the DSUR below will correct
for that). By synergies we mean special links between states: for instance, many
people working in Washington DC live in Virginia, where they can find better
schools for their children and cheaper accommodation. Moreover, the coeﬃcient
of adjustment (α) is negative and significant, thus supporting the cointegration
hypothesis and indicating the presence of lags in the response of consumption
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to income and wealth. Table A.3 reestimates the long-run coeﬃcients, including
seasonal dummies.
Mean Group Estimate Summary β1 β2 α
(without seasonal dummies)
MG .76 (13.51) .20 (5.18) -7.21 (-12.03)
No. of states with correct sign 50 44 51
No. of states with correct sign and significant coeﬃcients 38 22 35
(with seasonal dummies)
MG .87 (10.21) .16 (3.0) -.30 (11.59)
No. of states with correct sign 49 37 51
No. of states with correct sign and significant coeﬃcients 37 19 48
Table 4.3: Mean Group Estimates
Table 4.3 summarizes the main findings of the MG estimation (Tables A.2 and
A.3). β1 is the coeﬃcient of the log of real labour income, β2 is the coeﬃcient
of real housing prices, and α is the adjustment coeﬃcient. The first row of the
table shows the MG estimator. The housing price elasticity is 0.20 and is very
significant. The value of all MG elasticities decreases when seasonal dummies are
introduced, leading to a value of the housing price elasticity of 0.16. The table also
shows how many states have coeﬃcients with the correct sign and are significant.
The coeﬃcient on housing prices seems to be significant less frequent, however at
least more than half of the coeﬃcients that have the correct sign are significant.
By looking at the short-run results, the significance of the estimates shows
that consumption responds also to current period changes in labour income and
wealth (available from the author under request).
4.3.2. Pooled Mean Group Estimator
An intermediate estimator between the MG estimator above and a pooled estima-
tor (fixed or random eﬀects estimator) where coeﬃcients and error variances are
constrained to be same while the intercepts are allowed to diﬀer across groups, is
the PMG developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). It allows the intercepts,
short-run coeﬃcients and error variances to diﬀer across groups, but the long-run
coeﬃcients are restricted to be identical among groups.
We use the MG estimates as initial estimates of the long-run parameters for the
pooled maximum likelihood function and the Newton-Raphson algorithm since it
considers the first and the second derivative of the log-likelihood function.
Table 4.4 illustrates the results. The housing price elasticities vary from 0.19
to 0.22 depending of the lag structure chosen when seasonal dummies are not
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ARDL Seasonal Dummies Pooled Mean Group Restricted DSUR
SBC no .224(19.680)
SBC yes .195(11.797)
1,1,1 no .213(16.711)
1,1,1 yes .191(10.829)
0,3,3 no .186(19.093)
0,3,3 yes .208(29.181)
3lags3leads no .166(34.21)
3lags3leads yes .186(51.00)
Table 4.4: Pooled Estimates of the Long-Run Housing Price Elasticity
included. If included, the elasticity ranges from 0.19 to 0.20.
4.3.3. Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Regression (DSUR) Estimator
Following Mark, Ogaki and Sul (2003) we consider N cointegrating regressions
where N is fixed. Each equation has a triangular representation,
yit = x

itβi + u¯it (4.4)
∆xit = eit (4.5)
A problem can arise in equation 4.4, since there exists correlation between
the equilibrium error of equation i and leads and lags of first diﬀerences of the
regressors of all other equations j = 1, ...,N. Therefore we need to adjust for
possible spillover eﬀects among states by including leads and lags not only of
∆x1t but also leads and lags of ∆x2t through ∆xNt (zt) .
To purge endogeneity we project u¯it on zt:
u¯ = ztδi + ut (4.6)
where zt = (z

1t, ..., z

Nt) , i = 1, ..., N. and z

it =

∆xit+p, ...,∆x

it−p

and substitute the projection of u¯it into equation 4.4 gives:
yit = x

itβi + z

tδi + uit (4.7)
We then apply SUR to the above equation. This is the representation of the
DSUR. This model can be used in small to moderate systems where the number
of time periods, T , is substantially larger than the number of equations, N - as it
is in our case. The model is estimated using the asymptotically eﬃcient, feasible
generalized least-squares algorithm.
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The main attraction of the DSUR is that it takes into account the long-run
cross-sectional dependence in the equilibrium errors in estimation and is asymp-
totically eﬃcient. The test for cross-sectional dependence we estimate the inno-
vation covariance matrix of the consumption function. The last row of Table 4.5
show whether the oﬀ-diagonal elements in the innovation covariance matrix can
be restricted to zero using the Breusch and Pagan test of independence of the
residuals. Clearly the null is rejected.
Table 4.5 shows the elasticities of labour income and housing prices with or
without seasonal dummies included. Most of the housing price elasticities are
significantly diﬀerent from zero and diﬀer quite a lot among states. The average
is 0.23 (0.17) when seasonal dummies are (are not) included.
In addition, we also calculate a restricted DSUR by assuming that β1 = β2 = β
and stack the equation together:
y˜t = x˜tβ + ut (4.8)
The results are shown in last column of Table 4.4. The elasticity ranges be-
tween 0.17 and 0.19 depending whether seasonal dummies are included.
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(1) (2)
State lags β1 β2 R¯
2 lags β1 β2 R¯
2
leads leads
Alabama 3,3 .777(19.37) .477(11.97) .63 3,3 .795(23.64) .546(14.80) .84
Alaska 3,3 .092(1.69) .180(6.10) .40 3,3 .100(2.55) .178(8.17) .69
Arizona 3,3 .248(2.99) .352(5.90) .37 3,3 .159(2.29) .318(6.27) .65
Arkansas 3,3 .545(10.46) .034(.68) .47 3,3 .615(15.04) .130(3.35) .77
California 3,3 .473(3.09) -.245(-5.92) .50 3,3 .423(3.62) -.245(-8.05) .74
Colorado 3,3 1.016(16.19) -.197(-5.17) .53 3,3 1.001(19.12) -.160(-5.21) .76
Connecticut 3,3 .663(12.55) .437(16.33) .81 3,3 .573(12.61) .468(20.30) .91
Delaware 3,3 .380(3.31) .337(5.33) .64 3,3 .213(2.42) .460(9.68) .77
DC 3,3 -.080(-1.65) .037(1.18) .46 3,3 -.089(-1.90) .037(1.26) .49
Florida 3,3 .694(14.97) .709(5.07) .70 3,3 .746(24.36) .885(9.12) .88
Georgia 3,3 .576(13.23) .528(5.46) .54 3,3 .541(13.98) .585(6.87) .77
Hawaii 3,3 .067(.66) .583(15.74) .75 3,3 .074(.90) .550(18.26) .89
Idaho 3,3 .759(8.22) .443(8.10) .43 3,3 .707(8.80) .383(8.16) .61
Illinois 3,3 .470(3.63) .099(1.42) .42 3,3 .306(3.39) .218(4.41) .77
Indiana 3,3 .401(6.04) .412(7.71) .57 3,3 .408(8.21) .483(11.81) .81
Iowa 3,3 .822(16.91) .029(1.15) .56 3,3 .834(22.50) .062(3.34) .83
Kansas 3,3 1.10(10.66) .310(5.28) .41 3,3 1.162(15.09) .373(8.63) .77
Kentucky 3,3 1.446(33.96) -.173(-3.70) .84 3,3 1.420(43.49) -.095(-2.29) .95
Louisiana 3,3 .604(8.75) .293(8.90) .50 3,3 .600(12.30) .309(13.30) .78
Maine 3,3 .992(11.37) .036(.88) .62 3,3 .922(12.51) .042(1.30) .84
Maryland 3,3 1.289(14.97) -.989(-11.68) .52 3,3 1.163(18.08) -.813(-13.59) .80
Massachusetts 3,3 .736(8.96) .130(3.96) .77 3,3 .704(13.94) .142(7.14) .92
Michigan 3,3 1.445(18.65) -.276(-5.50) .70 3,3 1.410(24.42) -.274(-7.77) .88
Minnesota 3,3 .551(12.59) .490(6.38) .43 3,3 .609(19.64) .772(14.45) .87
Mississippi 3,3 .648(16.93) .522(16.04) .54 3,3 .733(23.63) .607(21.07) .75
Missouri 3,3 .838(15.64) .006(.11) .57 3,3 .815(18.13) .043(.90) .81
Montana 3,3 .672(5.57) .234(6.19) .42 3,3 .624(5.52) .282(8.07) .58
Nebraska 3,3 .784(15.05) .326(8.35) .47 3,3 .858(21.36) .462(14.79) .80
Nevada 3,3 -.070(-.57) .161(1.77) .17 3,3 -.094(-.87) .315(4.04) .49
New Hampshire 3,3 1.046(17.64) .202(6.01) .76 3,3 .939(23.63) .232(11.61) .90
New Jersey 3,3 -.004(-.04) .265(5.67) .50 3,3 -.080(-1.11) .308(9.83) .78
New Mexico 3,3 .742(10.44) .755(15.99) .52 3,3 .757(12.89) .804(20.28) .79
New York 3,3 .475(4.60) .076(1.71) .48 3,3 .421(5.66) .105(3.47) .75
North Carolina 3,3 1.080(23.34) -.041(-.44) .76 3,3 1.055(29.60) .055(.78) .92
North Dakota 3,3 1.108(15.15) .108(3.39) .56 3,3 1.202(19.59) .126(4.65) .77
Ohio 3,3 1.053(11.59) .060(1.30) .58 3,3 .995(14.79) .074(2.27) .83
23
Oklahoma 3,3 -.044(-.52) -.085(3.39) .18 3,3 .032(.45) .099(4.60) .43
Oregon 3,3 1.580(12.18) -.106(-2.23) .37 3,3 1.467(13.19) -.046(-1.13) .68
Pennsylvania 3,3 .751(9.05) .243(5.68) .62 3,3 .587(8.98) .330(10.67) .82
Rhode Island 3,3 .104(1.31) .313(10.94) .59 3,3 .014(.19) .335(12.11) .81
South Carolina 3,3 .864(29.71) .072(1.07) .80 3,3 .872(42.77) .148(3.01) .94
South Dakota 3,3 .940(16.81) -.143(-2.94) .63 3,3 .933(20.30) -.137(-3.58) .83
Tennessee 3,3 1.278(46.76) .171(3.58) .86 3,3 1.265(68.64) .211(6.18) .97
Texas 3,3 .982(11.71) .393(10.79) .35 3,3 1.102(15.64) .444(14.42) .77
Utah 3,3 .232(3.29) .213(7.82) .49 3,3 .241(4.18) .255(11.20) .78
Vermont 3,3 .718(8.46) .203(3.60) .55 3,3 .670(8.39) .182(3.37) .76
Virginia 3,3 .492(9.56) .198(3.18) .58 3,3 .503(12.05) .159(3.05) .85
Washington 3,3 .971(10.62) .068(1.36) .68 3,3 .750(11.28) .179(4.73) .94
West Virginia 3,3 -.079(-1.24) .000(.01) .12 3,3 -.026(-.48) .002(.09) .26
Wisconsin 3,3 .373(4.44) .092(2.09) .27 3,3 .371(5.73) .157(4.50) .71
Wyoming 3,3 -.76(-4.83) .483(9.63) .59 3,3 -.791(-5.66) .503(10.84) .63
Seasonal Dummies no yes
B-P test independence chi2(1275) = 30733.553 chi2(1275) = 11066.492
of residuals p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000
Average 3,3 0.644(10.67) 0.173(4.17) 3,3 0.620(13.72) 0.227(6.27)
Table 4.5: Unrestricted DSUR Estimates
4.3.4. Aging of Population and Homeownership
Venti and Wise (1991, 2001, 2002), McFadden (1994a, 1994b), Hoynes and Mc-
Fadden (1997), Mankiw andWeil (1989), Hurd (1997), and Bosworth et al. (1991)
studied the eﬀect of changes in the housing equity of the aged on consumption and
wealth and came to diﬀerent conclusions. Therefore, the empirical evidence on
the eﬀects of an aging population on consumption and wealth is not clear cut. It
is not clear whether demographic characteristics have a positive or negative eﬀect
on consumption. In the same vain, it is not clear whether increases (decreases)
in elderly home equity arising from capital gains (losses) are translated into con-
sumption. In our model the diﬀerences among house price coeﬃcients imply that
there exist diﬀerent behaviour among states. There are two variables that can
potentially explain these diﬀerences: diﬀerent rates of aging of population and
homeownership among states. The percentage of the population age 65 and older
rose sharply after 1975 and will continue to rise for the next forty years. Table
A.4 illustrates the proportion of population aged 45 years or more (and 65 years
or more). There appears to be a pattern: States with negative or insignificant
housing coeﬃcients are states with a relatively low proportion of households with
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heads aged 45 years or more. This is the case of California, Alaska, Colorado and
Georgia (among others).
The second factor that could explain the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is home-
ownership rates in each state. The greater the proportion of households who are
homeowners, the more the wealth eﬀect dominates at the aggregate level9. Ta-
ble A.5 shows homeownership rates for 1986, 1990 and 1996. States with lower
homeownership rates are the states with negative or insignificant housing price
coeﬃcients. DC, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada are examples.
In what follows, we try to give further evidence on the changes in consumption
after retirement and the possible eﬀects on consumption of converting housing eq-
uity into liquid assets. To this end, we include the proportion of population aged
45 or more in the long-run relationship to control for aging population and the
results are shown in Table A.6 and A.7 using both Mean Group and DSUR esti-
mations, respectively. β3 is the coeﬃcient of the aging variable that happens to be
significant for at least half of the states. Housing coeﬃcients, however, still diﬀer
widely among states. Consequently, we conclude that after controlling for diﬀerent
rates of aging populations, there are big diﬀerences in the response of consump-
tion to housing prices. Moreover, it is not possible for us to shed more light on
the earlier discussions in the literature about the sign of the demographic impact
on consumption via housing wealth. Around half of the significant coeﬃcients of
the aging population variable are positive and the other half are negative.
5. Compare and Contrast
As mentioned in the Introduction, Case et al. (2001) follow a roughly similar pro-
cedure. They estimate regressions relating consumption to income, stock wealth
and housing wealth for a panel of the 50 US states and District of Columbia. They
deflate all variables by the national GDP deflator and test for unit roots in the
time series, rejecting the hypothesis of unit roots in the data for most of the series.
They use three diﬀerent specifications including fixed eﬀects and adding a serial
correlation correction and a lagged dependent variable and estimate the regression
in diﬀerences10. The estimated eﬀect of housing market wealth on consumption
in their work ranges from 0.05 to 0.09.
9The homeownership rate at the US is 68 per cent in the first quarter of 2003, an increase
of 4 percentage points from 1993 due basically to the aﬄuent baby boomers and the entrance
in the market of minority middle class (immigrants). New finance alternatives have allowed
low-wealth households to qualify for loans to become homeowners.
10The use of diﬀerences avoids the pitfall of spurious correlation due to common trending
series, however it tends to lead to the omission of the long-run relationship that may exist
among levels of these variables.
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